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1 On 25 November 2012, while speaking at the opening ceremony for an airport in the
city of Kütahya, then Turkish Prime Minister (now President) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
veered from his remarks on the progress Turkey had seen under the past decade of his
Justice and Development Party’s (AK-Party) rule to lambast one of the country’s most
popular TV shows, the sometimes sultry Ottoman costume drama Magnificent Century
[Muhteşem Yüzyıl], which depicts the sixteenth century reign of Sultan Süleyman the
Magnificent.  Noting that  opposition leaders  had criticized his  government’s  foreign
policy, Erdoğan responded by saying,
We know our responsibilities. We’ll  go everywhere that our [Ottoman] ancestors
went on horseback, we’ll take an interest in all those places. But I think some may
be  thinking  of  our  ancestors  as  they’re  shown on  the  television  screen  in  that
documentary,  Magnificent  Century.  We do not  have ancestors  like that.  We don’t
recognize  that  Süleyman.  [The  real  Süleyman]  spent  30  years  of  his  life  on
horseback, not in the palace like you see on the TV series. You really need to know
and understand this. I condemn the directors and the owner of the channel before
our  nation.  And since  they’ve  been  warned,  I  expect  a  judicial  decision  on  the
matter.1
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2 Though Erdoğan did not detail his concerns with the show, he tapped into a debate
about  respect  for  Ottoman  heritage  that  began  to  plague  Century even  before  its
premiere.  The debate has many facets,  but often crystallizes over questions of  how
“truthful”  the  program’s  representation  of  history  is  and  the  issue  of  whether
ancestors  are  to  be  viewed  as  sacred  heroes  or  human  beings  with  potential
weaknesses. In addition to being one of the top shows on Turkish television for its four-
season run, Century now commands a global audience of over 200 million across more
than 40 countries and its influence continues to grow,2 so the implications of the debate
reverberate well beyond the Turkish borders.3 This international success would appear
to be part of what fuels the domestic debate about the show, as some Turks celebrate
the program’s “conquering” of the world and others bewail  the picture of Ottoman
heritage depicted therein. 
3 Though Century was the first in a recent crop of Ottoman-themed media texts4, it is far
from  the  only  production  of  that  sort.  It  was  followed  by  an  epic  film  about  the
conquering of Istanbul, Conquest 1453 [Fetih 1453], and by a number of other TV shows
across a variety of genres. Of the many attempts, so far, only Century and Conquest have
seen commercial success, and yet their modes of telling and their approach to history
are  markedly  different,  leading  to  questions  about  what  is  necessary  for  historical
drama to connect with a public.5 
4 I here attempt to answer that question with a three-part discussion. First, I  turn to
some of  the existing literature focusing on the recent surge of  interest in Ottoman
heritage in Turkey, trying to understand how this trend arose and how it relates to
politics. Next, I examine the issue of nostalgia, employing Svetlana Boym’s distinction
between  reflective  and  restorative  nostalgia  to  highlight  two  markedly  different
approaches  to  the  past  that  seem  to  exist  in  the  Turkish  milieu.  Distilling  Boym’s
distinction through the work of other thinkers, I situate it in relation to a notion of
publics that helps me to characterize the success or failure of a text. I then turn to four
such texts —all of which represent the Ottoman past in unique ways— and attempt to
classify them with regard to their nostalgic approach, building a cumulative case that
reflective depictions of the past are more likely to engage publics than restorative ones
in the TV environment. Ultimately, I suggest that reflective and restorative approaches
may actually engage different publics in different ways. 
 
I. Ottoman heritage as a value for the present
5 The current rage for all things Ottoman is a fait accompli in Turkey. Ottoman history
texts and Ottoman-inspired historical fiction are being written faster than ever before
and selling briskly.  Consumer trends ranging from Ottoman-themed home decor to
jewellery to clothing to food to the hanging of imperial seals [tuğras] in car and shop
windows  are  all  on  the  rise.  Traditional  arts  such  as  paper  marbling  [ebru]  are
experiencing a revival, as is interest in the Ottoman language itself. Historical museums
are packing visitors at greater numbers every year and a variety of Ottoman-themed
museums and amusement parks have arisen as well.6 Celebrations of the conquering of
Istanbul  on  29  May  1453  have  grown  to  become  major  public  spectacles  and
government and private forces are undertaking “restoration” projects on Ottoman-era
monuments and buildings across Istanbul and the nation at an unprecedented rate,
though the aims, scope, and execution of these is often highly controversial.
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6 This state of affairs has become increasingly visible in the last twenty years. As the
trend of adopting and displaying would-be Ottoman related trappings and practices in
various  social  fields  —public,  private,  state,  and  commercial—  has  conquered  the
territory  of  history  in  everyday life,  the  once  “official”  historical  narratives  of  the
Turkish  republican  and  the  ancient  Turkic  pasts  have  lost  much  of  their  sheen.
Prevalent narratives of this so-called neo-Ottomanism often tie the cultural side of this
trend to a concurrent populist and sometimes Islamist political movement that had
roots  in  the Democrat  Party  of  the  1950s,  gained much strength with the National
Vision  [Milli  Görüş]  movement  of  Necmettin  Erbakan  from  the  1970s  to  1990s,  and
attained a more stable form of political legitimacy with the coming to power of the
Justice  and  Development  Party  (AK-Party)  lead  by  Recep  Tayyip  Erdoğan  in  2002.
Though this outline does form a relatively tenable narrative for the rise of this trend,
recent scholarship provides a more detailed picture of how this resurgent interest in
the Ottoman past arose and how it has circulated socially and politically.
7 Focusing on what she calls a struggle over Ottoman heritage in Istanbul, Ayşe Öncü
identifies  two  different  narratives  that  have  arisen  since  the  1990s.  Both  the  Belle
Époque and  the  conquest-to-tolerance  narratives  glorify  the  Ottoman  past  by
emphasizing  the  peaceful  coexistence  of  a  variety  of  cultures  under  Ottoman rule.
Despite this surface similarity and the fact that they sometimes even refer to the same
aspects of Ottoman history, however, they are quite different in their contemporary
political  content  and  motivation.  According  to  Öncü,  the  Belle  Époque narrative
emphasizes  the  various  cultures  existing  in  cosmopolitan  Istanbul  in  the  late
nineteenth century and tends to be popular among a secular elite (Öncü 2007: 238). The
Islamic conquest-to-tolerance narrative, on the other hand, looks further to the past,
revelling in the conquering of Istanbul and yet touting the tolerance for other religions
displayed by the victorious  Ottomans.  This  narrative  came to  prominence with the
“second conquest”  of  Istanbul  in  1994,  when Recep Tayyip  Erdoğan was  elected  as
mayor of the metropolitan municipality (Öncü 2007: 242-243). 
8 Covering  related  territory  from a  perspective  of  ideological  affiliation,  Nora  Fisher
Onar (2009) typifies six different representations of the Ottoman past in accordance
with various political groups in Turkey. Kemalists, for Onar, reject the Ottoman legacy
and wish to leave it clearly in the past. Islamists, on the other hand, have two divergent
approaches to the legacy: the neo-imperialist, as typified by the Welfare Party [Refah
Partisi]  under  Necmettin  Erbakan  in  the  1990s,  and  the  pluralist-multiculturalist
branch, which Onar sees as exemplified in the writings of (now Prime Minister) Ahmet
Davutoğlu.  There  is  some  overlap  with  this  latter  category  and  that  of  political-
economic  liberals,  of  whom Turgut  Özal  is  Onar’s  prime example,  but  the  liberals,
unlike the pluralist Islamists, tend to uphold the post-Tanzimat period as their prime
example of Ottoman multiculturalism. The typology is rounded out by two divergent
ultra-nationalist  takes  on  the  Ottomans:  a  rather  racist  approach,  which  finds  in
Ottoman tolerance a  reason for  the downfall  of  the  Turks,  and a  pan-Turkist,  pro-
Ottoman view, which sees the Ottomans as one of many great Turkish dynasties. 
9 Drawing both on Onar and Öncü, Amy Mills undertakes a discussion of the Ottoman
legacy grounded in ethnographic work in the Istanbul neighbourhood of Kuzguncuk,
unearthing two discourses very much in keeping with the narratives highlighted by
Öncü (Mills 2011: 192). Yet for Mills, the most relevant aspect of these discourses is
their functional overlap. As she puts it,  “the Ottoman legacy has become a catchall
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geographic imaginary produced locally: leftists, human rights activists, secularists, and
intellectuals, as well as Islamist politicians and conservative, nationalist policy makers,
invoke Ottoman multi-ethnic tolerance as they engage in local identity politics” (Mills
2011: 193). Mills finds that, whether coming from a relatively more liberal/secular or
conservative/Islamic perspective, the Ottoman past is selectively employed to tout a
kind of cosmopolitanism that, ironically, can only be celebrated once the human actors
upon which it is based —Jews, Armenians, and Greeks in the case of Kuzguncuk— have
been removed. 
10 To the extent that the Ottoman legacy gains popularity among various groups,  this
function as a “catchall imaginary” is highly contextual. That is, where Öncü notes two
competing Ottoman heritage narratives circulating in greater Istanbul, Mills finds that
parallel discourses actually work in concert with one another in the particular locale of
Kuzguncuk, and in the representation of Kuzguncuk to the rest of the country.7 Rather
than betraying a contradiction, I believe that this juxtaposition reveals a general truth:
when the past functions as a value for the present its use will always be contingent. 
11 The Ottoman legacy is subject to great admiration and great dispute precisely because
it is malleable. In the case of Kuzguncuk, the past is malleable because there are few
original inhabitants left to tell their own versions of history. In the case of Turkish
history writ large, the sea change between the one-time Kemalist “status quo” and the
quasi-Islamic, quasi-Ottomanist populism of the AK-Party has opened the way for a re-
valuation of historical narratives generally, with the Ottoman past as a locus of great
value and, hence, struggle. In effective terms, one of the key venues for this struggle is
popular media, because it is here that different ideologies of representation emerge
and circulate, upholding different mythical pasts that infer different understandings of
the present. 
 
II. Nostalgia and its public(s)
12 Though the case of Turkey is certainly unique, the country is not alone in terms of a
tendency to revalue the past. The trend may be linked to the global phenomenon that
Andreas Huyssen (2003) has dubbed a “culture of memory,” a trend whereby mediation
has  brought  the past  increasingly  into  our  present,  fundamentally  changing  our
relationship with history and memory in the process. For Huyssen, this trend is tied
directly to the increasing prominence of media in our daily lives. He points out that the
rise of information technologies and archival capacities has been accompanied by a rise
in the “musealization” (a term drawn from Hermann Lübbe) of many aspects of our
lives. Elsewhere8 I trace the overlaps between Huyssen’s culture of memory and the rise
of nostalgia, a trend commented on by Fredric Jameson (2005), Arjun Appadurai (1996),
Kathleen  Stewart  (1988),  and  Svetlana  Boym  (2001).  Though  there  are  important
differences between these thinkers in terms of both framework and goals, they are in
accordance in seeing the rise of nostalgia as indicative of a malaise brought on by the
(post)modern conditions of late capitalism. In a time when visions of the future are
increasingly bleak, the past provides a seemingly familiar territory that offers some
(admittedly elusive) promise of navigability. Crucially, the role of media is key in the
spread  of  this  nostalgia,  often  harnessing  the  sensibility  for  commercial  gain  and
introducing highly idealized portraits of the past (or even the present in the case of
Jameson) for consumption. 
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13 If the culture of memory and the rising tide of nostalgia are worldwide phenomena it
will  come as little surprise that their presence in Turkey has received commentary.
Esra Özyürek (2006) has made a convincing argument that the 1990s political shift that
saw  the  rise  of  Islamist  parties  was  accompanied  by  the  personalization  and
privatization  of  state  iconography  by  a  number  of  secularists.  This  trend  is,  for
Özyürek, indicative of a “nostalgia for the modern” —a longing for the positivist era of
Republican Turkey marked by Kemalist ideology and the belief that the nation’s future
lay  with  the  project  of  Western  modernity.  This  nostalgia  can  of  course  be
counterpoised to that focusing on the Ottoman past, termed Ottomanalgia by Ufuk Adak
(2013),9 providing us  with a  distinction between nostalgia  for  that  which nearly  all
Turkish citizens have lived (Republican Turkey) and a longing for the past that must be
more overtly imagined (Ottoman Empire). While this distinction merits consideration,10
both of these broad types of nostalgia are ultimately idealist constructions, a point that
is emphasized by historian Edhem Eldem in an opinion piece on the politics at work in
2013’s Gezi Park protests: 
Turkey’s past has little to offer in terms of democratic inspiration. Ironically, there
is hardly any difference between the nostalgia for Ataturk-era secularism and the
A.K.P.’s glorification of the Ottoman imperial past. Both rest on the reinvention of
an imagined golden age—the former with a secularist emphasis, and the latter with
a focus on Islamic identity. And both look back fondly on authoritarian regimes,
which makes them all the less credible as political models for a democratic present
and future. (Eldem 2013)
14 A potentially more useful way of conceptualizing nostalgia is offered by Boym. She sets
forth a distinction between restorative and reflective varieties:
Restorative nostalgia stresses nostros and attempts a transhistorical reconstruction
of the lost home. Reflective nostalgia thrives in algia, the longing itself, and delays
the homecoming —wistfully, ironically, desperately. Restorative nostalgia does not
think of itself as nostalgia, but rather as truth and tradition. Reflective nostalgia
dwells on the ambivalences of human longing and belonging and does not shy away
from the contradictions of modernity. Restorative nostalgia protects the absolute
truth, while reflective nostalgia calls it into doubt. (Boym 2001: XVIII)
15 Rather than evaluating the, for lack of a better word, “authenticity” of the nostalgia
implied by the question of lived or “imagined,” Boym here looks at practices. Practice,
in turn, takes us to the realm of the people who experience nostalgia—its publics—and
what use they make of it, be that personal, social, or political. While Boym distinguishes
idealized types of nostalgia, I aim to alter this formula somewhat, exploring, instead,
different texts and the interactions that take place amongst their publics. The reasons
for this bear brief elaboration.
16 While nostalgia was once considered a disease and object for study it is now generally
thought  of  as  an  emotion  or  social  current.  The  latter  are  more  difficult  to  grasp
conceptually, and this often leads to their displacement onto individuals or texts. In
Boym’s own work, for example, we get statements such as, “the past for the restorative
nostalgic  is  a  value  for  the  present”  (Boym  2001:  49).  This  is  both  an  interesting
observation about value and a projection of a totalizing type—the restorative nostalgic
—onto a would-be individual.  Though Boym’s project is  not deeply troubled by this
situation, the general framework can lead to awkward moments when transported into
other investigations. In her insightful work on Kemalist nostalgia, for instance, Özyürek
suggests that said nostalgia would at first seem to have much in common with Boym’s
restorative category, but for the fact that those experiencing it do not really believe the
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bygone era can be restored. She notes that “although helpful conceptually, a purely
restorative nostalgia, as the nostalgia for the single-party regime of the early republic
demonstrates, proves difficult to maintain, especially if it is experienced by individuals,
rather  than  circulated  in  political  pamphlets”  (Boym  2001:  178).  Özyürek  correctly
points out that Boym’s idealized categories of nostalgia are hard to identify in specific
people, though they might be found in certain texts. While the latter may get us closer
to a nostalgic object, a related problem will emerge when trying to identify nostalgia in
the text because texts are inevitably open to multiple interpretations. 
17 A more useful approach may be to look at the situation in terms of a set of relations
between various actors: specifically, texts, their productive activations by individuals,
and  the  publics  constituted  by  this  interaction.  That  is,  rather  than  referring  to
restorative  or  reflective  nostalgia  writ  large,  I  prefer  to  speak  of  (potentially)
restorative texts and their (more soundly) restorative or reflective activations. When I
talk about the activation of a text, I am drawing on the work of Tony Bennett, who puts
forth  the  notion  of  a  reading  formation,  “a  set  of  intersecting  discourses  that
productively activate a given body of texts and the relations between them in a specific
way”  (Bennett  1983:  5).  Bennett’s  own  work  draws  on  the  notion  of  “discursive
formations” set forth by Michel Pêcheux (1982), though it also resonates with work on
discourse and intertextuality of Mikhail Bakhtin (e.g. 1981, 1984, 1986) and subsequent
critics.  The  crucial  understanding  that  I  draw  from  Bennett  is  that  a  text  has  no
inherent meaning but, rather, that meaning is constituted in and negotiated through
the various “readings” that take place as texts circulate discursively through time and
space. 
18 The limits on this circulation are, in turn, defined by the publics that interact with a
particular set of texts. Drawing on Michael Warner, a public can be conceived of as a
self-organized,  text-based  social  space  created  by  the  reflexive  and  temporal
circulation of discourse among strangers (Warner 2002: 67-119). While Warner suggests
that a public is constituted through “mere attention” to a text or a world of textual
discourse (Warner 2002: 87), in the case of Century there is a distinction to be made
between those viewing within the Turkish context and those viewing outside. This is
not a matter of political alignment —on the contrary, all those who take part in the
debate in Turkey, whether, to put it crudely, pro- or anti-Century, are part of the show’s
Turkey-based  public.  The  distinction  at  hand,  rather,  is  simply  one  of  contextual
knowledge. Language plays a major role in this,11 but so do encounters with history
education in the Turkish system, and awareness of  and sensitivity to socio-political
issues ranging from the Kurdish question to the role of Islam in public life to gender
norms to  the  legacy  of  Kemalism.  Century circulates  in  a  particular  manner  within
Turkey and in other manners without.12 And though one could certainly speak of the
program’s  greater  public,  I  will  limit  my  comments  in  this  essay  to  the  emic
perspective, focusing only on Century’s Turkey-based public. 
19 In  assembling  a  toolkit  to  analyse  the  public  formation  or  lack  thereof  for  recent,
Ottoman-themed  texts  in  Turkey,  I  have  thus  far  drawn  on  Boym’s  distinction  to
address types of nostalgia, Bennett’s notion of productive activation to clarify that such
nostalgia  is  revealed  through  practice,  and  Warner’s  account  of  publics  to
conceptualize the ultimate result of such practices. Before turning to the texts at hand
it will be useful to further equip this toolkit with a media-focused refinement. Marcia
Landy’s  work  on  cinematic  uses  of  the  past  incorporates  the  Nietzschean  (1991)
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distinction between monumental, antiquarian, and critical approaches to history in a
discussion  of  cinematic  genres,  and  her  interpretation  of  that  typology  is  worth
summarizing. 
20 Monumental approaches idealize heroic figures of the past, revelling in their deeds and
their power and frequently presenting historical effects as causes. This reverence for
the past is, for Nietzsche and Landy, often a way of downplaying the political figures of
the present. Antiquarian approaches, on the other hand, venerate the past in terms of
its artifacts and records, failing to make it a value for the present, and feeding “on a
frozen  and  fetishized  attachment  to  past  individuals  as  objects”  (Landy  1996:  19).
Critical approaches round out the typology and are characterized by a lack of reverence
for the past and a relativistic understanding of its role in the present. They tend to
emphasize the subjective agency of individuals from the past. 
21 In the discussion that follows, I situate these approaches alongside Boym’s typology to
better characterize the dynamics involved as publics engage (or fail to engage) with a
variety of Ottoman-themed texts. My analysis will at times be marked by an apparent
tension  between  classification  of  the  texts  themselves  and  classification  of  the
productive activations of the texts. At one time I may refer to a text as restorative and
monumental; at others I may refer to the reflective activations of a text by members of
its public. The line between these two can be murky, and this is all the more true when
one of the primary objects of study is the work of media critics commenting on the
shows themselves. In such cases, apparently, “restorative” texts may also be activated
in “reflective” ways by some of the cultural intermediaries (Bourdieu 1984) who have
taken them up.  Lest  there  be  any doubt,  my critical  position assumes all  texts  are
ultimately  activated,  and  thus  given  meaning,  by  their  users.  When  I  speak  of  a
“restorative” text, then, I am making a statement about its value relative to dominant
cultural currents in Turkey.
 
III. Activating nostalgia - texts and their viewing
formations13
Magnificent Century
22 In a parallel project14 I examine a number of discursive tropes that arose in the public
debate over Century, noting that each trope tends to have a, roughly speaking, pro- and
anti-Century side.  One  conclusion  from  that  analysis  is  pertinent  to  the  current
discussion: namely, that Century circulates as a reflectively nostalgic text in Turkey.
What I mean by this is that those who enjoy Century also tend to be those who activate
that text reflectively by, for example, questioning the Ottoman history that is taught in
Turkey,  viewing the  show in  an interpretive  framework where  irony may be  more
relevant than the issue of “truth,” and asking “what if” questions rather than making
“and thus” statements. 
23 To illustrate this trend I include here a brief example from what is perhaps the master-
trope  of  the  Century controversy:  the  taboo  on  sacred  history.  This  trope  engages
questions about whether certain historical figures and incidents should be subject to
representation at all and, if so, what sort of representation should be permissible. 
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24 The  first  time  I  met  with,  Günhan  Börekçi,  a  historical  consultant  to  Century,  he
happened to have been on location at Topkapı Palace earlier in the day,15 and he related
a conversation that had taken place there between himself and lead actor Halit Ergenç,
who  played  Sultan  Süleyman.  Ergenç  asked  Börekçi  what  he  thought  would  have
happened if Süleyman hadn’t had his oldest son and primary heir, Mustafa, killed, and
they discussed how different history might have been.16 Börekçi told me that one of the
useful aspects of Century is that it allows people to engage history with these sort of
“what if” questions. Questions that can be both accepting and critical at the same time
and, thus have, in Börekçi’s terms, a dialectical nature (2012). Posing such questions is
uncomfortable for those who wish to view Süleyman as infallible—it breaks a taboo on
the  sacred  nature  of  figures  such  as  Mehmed  II,  Süleyman,  and  Atatürk—but  it  is
precisely this kind of probing that is in line with Boym’s reflective nostalgia. 
25 Another  of  my  informants,  Ali,17 a  male  doctor,  displayed  similar  reflection  in  his
response to the show’s portrayal of relations between Charles V and Süleyman. When I
asked him how historically accurate he felt the show was, he told me the following:
The  show  is  going  in  the  right  direction.  I’m  not  a  professional  historian,  but
ultimately, it’s going to end with history. But there is something wrong in history.
Kanuni18 exaggerates a threat from the Spanish King and he goes to find him, that’s
what the program shows. This is  before Vienna, our troops are on their way to
campaign. Kanuni leads them to take Belgrade and the like. At that point the King
was already dealing with the English and he had conquered America. The question,
according to history,  is  what would it  benefit  him to come fight in Hungary or
Belgrade. But here it looks as if he’d run away—that’s not realistic. […] The Spanish
are dealing with America,  collecting gold,  tomatoes,  potatoes and the like.  Why
would they come fight a dark war, taking the time to gather 100,000 soldiers when
they’ve got so much else going on? That’s a really expensive project. The Ottomans
could gather people easily, but Spain was smaller and it was harder to rally troops. I
mean that’s what I know of history. Because in that time, the sixteenth century,
they had conquered America, it was full of gold. Why would they go fight Kanuni for
Hungary?  What’s  the  point?  [...]  Wars  are  all  about  money.  It’s  surprising  that
others weren’t there fighting for America. (May 2012)
26 In this rich moment Ali starts off with what could be called a critique of history itself:
“there’s something wrong in history.” Ultimately, what he seems to mean by this is that
both the show and the history that he learned in the Turkish educational system fail to
address key reasons that Charles V might have had for not fully engaging the Ottomans
between Süleyman’s taking reign in 1521 and the Siege of Vienna in 1529. Crucially, this
questioning of history (or, more accurately, Turkish historiography) arises in reaction
to the show, but clearly not as a passive adoption of the “truth” of the text. On the
contrary, Ali says that while he agrees with much of the history presented there, in this
case something is wrong. 
27 This kind of productive activation was repeated frequently: many viewers I spoke with
detailed similar  reactions,  and numerous internet  chat  rooms and Facebook groups
housed discussions devoted to topics such as this. It is significant that these critiques
come from fans of the show who continued to engage with the text and, thus, remain
part of its public. This is to say that something in the viewing formation surrounding
Century kept  audiences  reflecting  on  history  and watching  the  show,  despite  any
disagreements they may have had with the portrayal of history contained therein. 
28 Some answer to why this interest remained may be found if we look more closely at
Landy’s typology for mediated history. The depiction and reception of Sultan Süleyman
Re-creating history and recreating publics: the success and failure of recent...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 19 | 2014
8
would most likely be a hybrid of the monumental and critical approaches to history
discussed by Nietzsche and Landy. That is, it revels in the portrayal of Süleyman as a
great  hero of  the  time and yet  also  treats  his  character  subjectively,  exploring his
human side, and allowing viewers to form a bond with him. That it does so in part
through the frequent use of dream sequences and flashbacks, each of which ultimately
function  as  historical  explanation,  is  very  much  in  line  with  the  cause/effect
transposition noted by Landy as a mode of monumental telling (Landy 1996: 20-21). 
29 Another aspect of the monumental type is its potential for downplaying contemporary
political figures. Along this line there has been much commentary on Erdoğan’s unease
with Century,  as  critics  have suggested this  relates  to  the competing portrayal  of  a
“great man” on the Turkish airwaves. Satirical political cartoons, in particular, have
made a point of comparing Erdoğan with Century’s Süleyman, often with the implication
that the former craves the respect and attention lavished on the sultan.19 Whether this
is  psychologically valid for the man is  largely irrelevant;  what matters is  that such
discourse  circulates  actively  in  Turkey,  stoking  discussion  about  the  show  and
contributing to the viewing formation for the program. 
30 Finally, the lack of total reverence for the historical figure of Süleyman—the failure of
the producers and fans of the show to fetishize the character in the way those who
oppose it seem to have done—indicates that we are in the realm of a critical, rather
than antiquarian approach to history. The extent to which this is the case will become
clearer  as  we  proceed  to  other,  very  different,  portrayals  of  the  Ottoman  past,
examining what might have led to their success or failure to engage a public. I  will
make the case  that  the nostalgic  formations  emerging between the texts  and their
viewers have as much to do with their ultimate success as more commonly considered
issues such as production quality.
 
Conquest 1453 [Fetih 1453]
31 The first major Ottoman-era text to follow Century, Faruk Aksoy’s Conquest 1453 [Fetih
1453], was a film rather than a TV series. This formal distinction is highly relevant to
the question of publics and I will return to it shortly. Conquest was a 17 million USD
production that premiered at 14:53 on the seventeenth of February 2012 and quickly
went on to become the biggest Turkish box office hit to that date,20 surpassing multiple
iterations of an Aksoy-produced comedy series as well as the nationalistic crime drama
Valley of the Wolves Iraq. Conquest is an epic retelling of the conquering of Constantinople
under Sultan Mehmed II. It lavishes in action, and a large portion of the film’s budget
went into computer-generated imagery for battle scenes. The film presents a very black
and white version of history, with the Byzantine rulers portrayed as entirely corrupt
and the Ottomans as pure-hearted. Mehmed’s character is largely one-dimensional: he
is young, ambitious, and clever, and will stop at nothing in his quest to conquer the
city. He shows doubt just once in the film, when the siege of the city is going badly, and
this serves as the opportunity for him to receive a divine message from an Islamic
sheikh that will spur him on to victory. Perhaps noting the controversy aroused over
Süleyman’s portrayal in Century, the producers seem to have made a point of shopping
out even the obligatory love story to film’s secondary (and less sacred) hero, Ulubatlı
Hasan, who dies while planting the Ottoman flag atop one of Constantinople’s towers. 
Re-creating history and recreating publics: the success and failure of recent...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 19 | 2014
9
32 We can see evidence of both of the Ottoman narratives mentioned by Öncü in this film,
but with an interesting twist. Öncü suggests that the shift from a narrative of conquest
to tolerance came about because the conquest metaphor had worn thin and something
more  in  keeping  with  the  neoliberal  market  policies  of  the  AK-Party  was  required
(Öncü 2007: 244). While the metaphor may well have worn thin, the narrative (and the
discourse)  of  conquest  are  still  alive  and well  both across  Istanbul  and throughout
Turkey  today,  and  nowhere  is  this  represented  more  clearly  than  in  the  awkward
synthesis of conquest and tolerance enacted in the final scenes of the film. Immediately
after an incredibly graphic battle, Sultan Mehmed II acknowledges the body of recently
killed Emperor,  Constantine XI,  and then marches to claim Hagia Sophia,  where he
encounters  hundreds of  frightened  Christians  who  have  sought  refuge.  Mehmed
addresses them kindly, assuring them that they have nothing to fear, and even picks up
a small blond girl, allowing her to touch his face.21 The film ends on this happy note of
tolerance,  leaving untold the story of  looting and pillaging that was so violent and
destructive  that  Mehmed  actually  put  a  stop  to  it  after  two  days  rather  than  the
customary three.
33 Further description of the film, which was panned in Greece and banned in Lebanon for
its base portrayal of Christian characters, would only serve to highlight that Conquest
partakes in a largely restorative telling of Turkish history. In Landy’s terms, the film
would be a hybrid between monumental and antiquarian approaches to history—it is
monumental as the heroic struggle of an individual in place of the nation and yet it is
antiquarian in its fetishized approach to the figure of Mehmed, utilizing a second hero,
Hasan (also a figure from legends of the conquest), to partake as a surrogate in the
more human aspects of the drama. 
34 Critical  reception22 of  the  film  tended  to  split  along  ideological,  educational,  or
religious  lines,  though  not  in  a  simplistic  fashion.  Secular  columnist  Burak  Bekdil,
writing in the English-language liberal daily Hurriyet Daily News, derides the chauvinism
of the film (Bekdil 2012a), and then mentions the various threats he received in the
wake  of  that  column  as  evidence  of  the  nationalism  and  naiveté  of  the  Turkish
populace  (Bekdil  2012b).  Historian  and  long-term  resident  in  Turkey,  Vangelis
Kechriotis, writes ironically about all the “possible” (though implausible) aspects of the
film in the liberal daily Radikal, but says that the ending with the child is completely
beyond belief,  even for  those  raised  on the  logic  of  video games  (Kechriotis  2012).
Another  foreigner  with  deep experience  of  Turkey,  Andrew Finkel,  notes  the  same
scene as breaking all credibility in his piece for the liberal daily Taraf. He comments
that there is no way for a foreigner who did not grow up with this legend to take part in
the film, in part because it is presented as a chronicler’s account, ignoring the rules of
character creation or realistic drama (Finkel 2012). Finkel’s critique becomes the fodder
for an ironic response by Radikal columnist Ezgi Başaran, who suggests that indeed it is
impossible for foreigners to understand the film. Her column is a critique of Turkish
society and its love for such a film despite an overt ignorance about historical facts
(Başaran 2012). 
35 Such  accounts  emphasize  the  chauvinism  of  the  film,  the  worship  of  the  heroic
characters, the valorisation of violence, and the shallow portrayal of history as a series
of memorized events rather than humanized experience. Indeed, historian and Century
historical advisor Günhan Börekçi, who had not seen Conquest when I spoke to him, said
that, as a result of the Turkish educational system, many aspects of that story were
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entirely fixed and memorized by Turkish audiences in advance, and the filmmakers
would have been obliged to follow that “script” (Börekçi 2012)23. In one group interview
I did with religious students at a university in Istanbul,  my informants dismissively
referred to the film as “science fiction” in discussing how unbelievable its portrayal of
history was, and noted that people were expecting something like Gladiator and were
thus also disappointed by the effects (April 2013). Many of the secular interlocutors
that I interviewed about Century had simply refused to watch Conquest.24 For those who
had,  though,  the response I  received from Ali,  the doctor quoted in the section on
Century,  was  typical:  “ridiculous”  (May  2012).  This  speaks  to  the  possibility  of  two
rather different publics for the productions. Though I am sure there is overlap between
the two groups, my experience also suggests quite potent detest for the “other” text
from what might be called extreme members of each group.
36 Praise of  the film tended to come from more conservative camps.  M Nedim Hazar,
writing for  the Gülen-movement  paper  Zaman,25 notes  the difficulty  of  producing a
historical  drama and finds  Conquest highly  successful  in  terms  of  costumes,  special
effects, and war scenes. What’s more, he notes that the film avoids the “mistakes” of
similar projects,  which depict the Sultan sharing a bed with more than one woman
among their various insults to history. He is disappointed, however, with the portrayal
of  history  overall  because  the  film fails  to  demonstrate  the  incredible  intelligence,
education,  and  strategy  that  were  part  of  Mehmed  II’s  character,  and  instead
exaggerates the glory of Ulubatlı Hasan, thus making it like a Hollywood production
(Hazar 2012). 
37 Ali Murat Güven, writing a lengthy review for Islamist intellectual daily Yeni Şafak, is far
less  parsimonious  in  his  praise,  saying  it  is  about  time  for  Turkey  to  have  such  a
sensational film, and noting that Conquest dodges the trap of histrionics so common
among productions from a nationalist and conservative perspective. His review reads
as a response not just to the film, nor to the liberal critiques noted above but, rather, to
conservative religious critics who object to the lack of proper beards on some of the
characters, or to the portrayal of scantily-clad women in the Byzantine palace,26 or to
the love story between Hasan and Era, which Güven defends as pure despite the lack of
a religious ceremony to consummate it. Interestingly, he repeats the defensive claim
frequently issued by Century’s writer Meral Okay, that this is not a documentary and
should  not  be  judged as  such,  but  then goes  on to  say  that,  unlike  Century,  whose
writers “intentionally and knowingly give false information,” Conquest is simply a case
of acceptable artistic license in the representation of history. He does not, however,
clarify the criteria on which he bases this distinction. By way of conclusion he notes
that (then) Prime Minister Erdoğan is reported to have watched the film and enjoyed it.
“What else could have happened?” he asks rhetorically, “Would it be possible for a
person who shows unconditional love to Istanbul and has given service to the city for
so many years not to like this film?” (Güven 2012).
38 Though these examples are by no means exhaustive, they serve to demonstrate the
existence of two different approaches to history, or nostalgia, at work in the viewing
formations of Conquest. I have argued that the text itself could, in the dominant Turkish
setting,  be  considered  restorative.  In  fact,  those  who  criticized  the  film  often
disparaged its restorative aspects and those who lauded it frequently praised the same
characteristics.  It  is  indeed the very richness of this debate coupled with the film’s
commercial success that suggest it connected with a public. Conquest stayed in Turkish
Re-creating history and recreating publics: the success and failure of recent...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 19 | 2014
11
cinemas for one year, reaching a total viewership of 6,572,618 and thus becoming the
most-watched film ever in Turkey (Turkish or otherwise), until it was surpassed in 2014
by the comedies Düğün Derneği and Recep Ivedik 4. 
 
IV. The form factor
39 Thus far I have argued that Century and Conquest circulated in Turkey in reflectively and
restoratively nostalgic manners, respectively, and I have suggested that they may have
appealed to different publics  as  well,  though some overlap between these is  highly
likely. Beyond these matters, the forms of the two texts also bear consideration. Century
was a three-and-a-half-year-long TV series that ran for about two hours per week and
for  approximately  40  episodes  per  year.27 It  was  watched on television  and on  the
internet. The former often took place in a family setting where viewing was interrupted
by  commercials.  Such  an  environment  invites  conversation  and  the  use  of  mobile
devices  for  “fact  checking,”  a  practice  that  many informants  confirmed.  The series
format meant that producers had to create nearly two hours of content per week, so
the plot tended to feature extended stories about personal relationships, sometimes
drawn from legend or foreign diplomatic accounts, other times created carte blanche.
These subplots fed into and decorated the telling of major events such as wars, treaties,
and executions that are well recorded in Ottoman and other documentary sources. The
series covered the 46-year span of Süleyman’s reign, with occasional flashbacks to his
time as a prince [şehzade]. 
40 Conquest, on the other hand, was released as a 160-minute film to be watched in a single
viewing.  The  filmic  viewing  environment  —darkened  room,  fixed  seats  facing the
screen, and the norms of polite behaviour— does not lend itself to conversation or fact-
checking, though the single intermission which is the Turkish norm does provide some
opportunity for this.  The storytelling in any film will  have to be compressed when
compared  to  that  in  a  TV series.  If  this  is  generally  the  case,  Conquest may  be  an
exaggeration of the norm insofar as the story and characters were already well-known
to the Turkish audience and didn’t have to be (and were not) so much developed as
revealed. (Recall Börekçi’s comments that the elements of the plot were scripted by the
Turkish educational system and Finkel’s observation that only someone raised on these
legends in Turkey could access the film.) The story narrated by Conquest is shorter than
that of Century, covering a three-year period with the occasional flashback to Mehmed’s
childhood  and  an  introductory  scene  that  begins  in  Mecca  at  the  time  of  Prophet
Muhammad. 
41 If these formal constraints suggest some of the reasons that Conquest presents a more
restorative picture of the past, the frenzy that greeted Century, which included death
threats  to  the  creators  when  the  show  first  appeared,  should  also  be  considered.
Conquest came  out  just  over  a  year  after  Century’s  premiere,  though  the  film’s
production had started well before the first episode of the TV show had aired. Aksoy,
making a film about one of the two most revered Ottoman sultans, would have known
quite well the reaction to the portrayal of the other that was presented in Century. 
42 Whether or not this atmosphere affected the production of Conquest, it likely affected
the  production  of  Ottoman  TV  shows  that  followed  Century,  none  of  which  have
managed to match the program’s success and the majority of which have been outright
failures. In the discussion that follows, I will present brief commentary on the modes of
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presentation of the most significant of these followers, building a case that restorative
nostalgia is a difficult mode to maintain over a long-term format such as a series. 
 
Once Upon a Time in the Ottoman Empire: Rebellion [Bir Zamanlar
Osmanlı: Kıyam]
43 The production that I will refer to as Rebellion for the sake of simplicity experienced
many setbacks over its four iterations. Set in the Tulip Era, a period known both for the
flourishing of arts and culture as well as for decadence, it is the story of the Patrona
Halil  Rebellion  that  brought  this  era  to  an  end.  It  was  produced  by  Her  Şey  Film
Productions for state-run channel TRT-1 and was initially advertised for release in late
2011 as This is the Ottoman Empire [Burası Osmanlı].28 Though the show, which featured
Turkish cinema legend Turkan Şoray, was heavily promoted early in the fall, its first
four episodes were scrapped because they were found to be “more like a documentary
than a drama series” (İzci 2012). The director of these episodes, Ezel Akay, chalked this
up to executive interference, saying, “The administrators at TRT said we’ll criticize you
if you touch on the Sultan’s private life. They think it will be just fine if the Sultan’s
bedroom  remains  unseen  and  we  believe  all  the  princes  were  brought  by  storks”
(Karabıyık 2012). 
44 The next iteration, still starring Şoray but now directed by Altan Dönmez and bearing
the Rebellion title, premiered in March of 2012 and continued through June of that year,
earning modest ratings on Mondays that were roughly a third of what Century was
receiving on the more competitive Wednesday night slot. The third iteration got a new
director,  Abdullah  Oğuz,  removed “rebellion”  from the  title,  and  added  heartthrob
Özcan Deniz to the cast, premiering in November of 2012. It was cancelled the following
month, however, owing both to dismal ratings and the departure of one if  its main
stars, Fırat Tanış,  who played Patrona Halil.  In the wake of the cancellation, Gülen-
affiliated broadcaster Samanyolu TV purchased the rights to the show, picked up a new
cast  and  director  (Kumral  Pakel),  and  premiered  Deep  State  in  the  Ottoman  Empire
[Osmanlı’da Derin Devlet] in April of 2013. This iteration, striking for its highly negative
portrayal of non-Sunni Islamic communities (Atay 2013a), concluded in July of the same
year.
45 Though Rebellion received heavy investment at every step of the way, featured major
stars,  and was helmed by some experienced directors,  it  was a consummate failure.
There are clearly many reasons for this. Early episodes were critiqued for the garishly
amateur choreography of  fight scenes,  the grating use of  contemporary jargon,  the
weak performance of actors, and striking errors such as having a car drive by in the
background at one point (Atay 2012; İzci 2012). Many questioned the wisdom of trying
to bring out a second Ottoman drama while one was already on the air. Beyond this
there was the issue of the period chosen, a moment from the so-called decline of the
Empire rather than its greatest triumph, as depicted in Conquest, or its apogee, as in
Century. According to TV critic Tayfun Atay, the choice to focus on a weak period of the
Empire  makes  Rebellion a  “brave  attempt”  particularly  in  the  face  of  the  current
“fetishization of all things Ottoman” (Atay 2012). 
46 While this may be true from the perspective of ratings, I suggest that the Tulip Era was
likely chosen with great care and thoughtful reference to the current Ottomania. As
Öncü has pointed out, this era has multiple meanings in Turkey, being a period of high
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art and culture in the Islamic tradition on the one hand but, on the other, one that
tends to be recalled in “‘common knowledge’ […] as a timeless moment when the poor
people of Istanbul went hungry while the Ottoman rulers were engaged in ‘pleasure-
seeking activities’”. For Öncü, the early 2000s were marked by the AK-Party’s attempt
to  reinvent  the  Tulip  Era  as  “an  imaginative  point  of  reference  when  the  Muslim
populations  of  Istanbul  occupied  a  privileged  status  and  Islam  was  the  locus  of
authority merging both religious and political power” (Öncü 2007: 246). 
47 We can see in Rebellion a continuation of this clearly restorative approach to Ottoman
nostalgia. The show was produced for and, according to initial director Akay, policed by
the state-run channel TRT, which has close ties to the AK-Party government. It featured
women dressed far more modestly than those in Century, and spent far less time on the
intrigues of the harem and palace life. Since the Sultan depicted, Ahmet III, is not one
of the sacred untouchables of the Ottoman line we can say that the avoidance of taboo
performed by the show relates not only to what is shown, but also to who is shown.
Shifting to Landy’s more fine-grained approach to depictions of the past, Rebellion is in
the realm of antiquarian history, lacking the monumental heroism of either Century or
Conquest. 
48 In this journey through Ottoman nostalgia we have thus far examined two TV shows
and one film; two restorative approaches, and one reflective. But the two restorative
texts that I’ve touched on differ from each other both in terms of format and in terms
of their approach to history as typified by Nietzsche. Conquest gave us a monumental
hero, put forth in all his glory while Rebellion gave us antiquated proscriptions on what
could be represented with regard to the past. It would be useful to have a monumental
restorative version of the past to compare with and, fortuitously, one was provided in
the fall of 2013. 
 
Conqueror [Fatih]29
49 The TV show Conqueror was a long time in the planning, though it was destined to have
only a short life on the air. In May of 2012 reports emerged that Show TV, the channel
that had brought forth Century,30 had signed a deal with Faruk Aksoy, the director of
Conquest. This included rights to show Conquest as the first four episodes of a new TV
drama that would continue after that point with an Aksoy-directed series in which
Devrim Evin would reprise his role as Mehmed II from where the film left off (Radikal
Staff 2012b). Six months later, word came out that, due to financial difficulties at Show
TV, the much-anticipated series had been cancelled despite nearly eight million USD
having already gone into the stage and props (Eyüboğlu 2012). The program was later
purchased by Kanal D, but without Aksoy or Evin and with a revised concept: the action
would pick up 20 years after the conquest of Istanbul, showing Mehmed in the mature
years of his leadership. Conqueror was heavily promoted by Kanal D and premiered at
the end of September 2013 as the third highest rated show for the evening, behind a
talent  competition  and  another  drama.  Despite  receiving  only  about  half  as  many
viewers  as  either  of  these  shows,  Conqueror was  heavily  discussed  on  Twitter  and
Facebook that night (Radikal Staff 2013). Unfortunately for Conqueror,  it would seem
that much of this discussion was negative. In subsequent weeks the ratings dropped
drastically and the program was pulled from the air at the start of November, after its
fifth episode. 
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50 As with Rebellion, there are many explanations for the show’s failure. İrfan Şahin, the
CEO  of  Kanal  D  and  the  man  ultimately  responsible  for Conqueror’s  purchase  and
broadcast,  told  me  he  had  strong  doubts  about  the  show  from  the  outset:  “Fatih
[Mehmed] is known as the conqueror of Istanbul. You can’t take a show that picks up 25
years after his major accomplishment and expect it to do well.” Comparing the show
with the Showtime drama The Tudors, he noted that Henry VII’s life was colorful both
before and after he took the crown. “Unfortunately,” he told me, “the same cannot be
said of Fatih” (Şahin 2013). 
51 A number of people commented on the lack of connection they felt for the character of
Mehmed,  some chalking this  up to  poor acting by Mehmet Akif  Alakurt  (Güleroğlu
2013), others noting that this is inherent in representation that keeps us distant from
the Sultan’s private life and only allows us to see his didactic speeches rather than his
inner  struggles  and  motivations  (Tekelioğlu  2013).  Some  critiques  focused  on  the
patent  attempts  to  imitate  aspects  of  Century.  Media  critic  Anibal  Güleroğlu,  for
instance,  noted that  the  character  of  Çiçek  Hatun was  a  clear  effort  to  cash in  on 
Century’s meddling Hürrem (Güleroğlu 2013), and my own observation is that, beyond
resemblances  in  costumes and setting,  which are  possibly  to  be expected,  the very
music used in the show was often strikingly similar, both with reference to melodies
and  the  deployment  of  thematic  types  across  scenes.  Century’s  historical  advisor,
Günhan  Börekçi,  had  suggested  over  a  year  before  Conqueror came  out  that  such
resemblances were likely, since the imaginative work that goes into creating such a
world is considerable. He told me, 
When  you  read  Ottoman  history  you  don’t  get  the  kinds  of  details  that  are
necessary for the show. There’s a lot we don’t know. So you either need to find that
information in  an  archive,  take  it  from another  example,  or  make a  guess.  My
colleagues rarely realize how difficult it is to create historical “reality” without a
substantial  pool  of  documents  and  secondary  literature.  That’s  where  the
imagination comes in. Meral Okay emphasized this. She read all that she could, but
there was plenty of stuff that couldn’t be found in what’s available to read. Now the
show is part of history and others can imitate it. (Börekçi 2012)
52 TV critics Tayfun Atay and Orhan Tekelioğlu both noted that,  in Turkey, there is  a
trend of trying to imitate successful program formats, and that the followers often tend
to fail. For Atay, this is the difference between “proactive” and “reactive” work, and
“the  reactive  work  is  hard”  (Atay 2013b) .  He  gives  an  example  of  how hard  when
describing Conqueror’s  place  within the greater  Ottoman-inspired media  framework.
Explaining that the last iteration of Rebellion, Deep State, was ethnocentric and that the
FOX Turkey comedy Harem31 is a parody, he suggests that it is hard to tell which of these
Conqueror more closely resembles because it is ethnocentric but has such bad acting
that it seems to be a parody.32 Noting that many audience members wanted the show to
be more about the conquest, he says, contra those fans and Kanal D’s Şahin, that staying
away from the conquest itself was the best thing the show could have done, but that
people in Turkey are not yet ready for anything other than a heroic portrayal of history
at this point. 
53 Tekelioğlu seems to flesh out Atay’s point about proactive versus reactive shows in his
discussion of why Conqueror failed: 
[Conqueror]  doesn’t  cause  us  to  wonder  about  the  past  in  the  same  way  that
Magnificent Century does. (Were our ancestors Turkish? Were most of the women in
the palace non-Muslims? Were the women’s concerns always like that? Why were
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there so  many  inappropriately  ambitious  men.  etc.)  Conqueror doesn’t  arouse
questions like this. Also, it’s hard to understand what kind of person Fatih was from
the show. We don’t see his difficulties and we don’t see him as a regular person, so
the portrait  presented of  him is  almost foreign.  We occasionally see him giving
patriotic didactic speeches. The show resembles the first era of Westerns or 1960s
Yeşilçam films about the Byzantines, with clear-cut good and bad characters. We
don’t  see  debates  about  our  ancestors,  nor  intimate  portraits,  nor  official
Republican ideology. (Tekelioğlu 2013)
54 What Tekelioğlu describes, whether intentionally or not, is a distinction very much in
keeping  with  that  between  reflective  and  restorative  nostalgia.  Güleroğlu  makes  a
similar point,  but in even stronger terms, telling us,  “Watching Conqueror it  doesn’t
even seem like a drama on a free channel. It’s impossible to escape from the feeling
that it’s being shown on a restricted Iron Curtain station as propaganda with a goal of
indoctrinating  certain  lessons”  (Güleroğlu 2014) .  Conqueror,  like  Conquest,  offers  a
restorative, monumental-antiquarian approach to the past: a nostalgia that treats the
lead character as a hero, but does not allow viewers access to his human side; one that
relishes in official history rather than inviting questions about what might have been. 
55 Where Conqueror differs from Conquest is in the matter of format. Restorative tellings
may work for the short span of a film, but they are much harder to maintain in the
serialized world of TV. Güleroğlu emphasizes this point as well: 
A TV show is not like cinema. The viewer in the home setting can come face to face
with the show to evaluate it more closely and has the right to watch an episode
again.  In this  setting the lifelessness of  Fatih,  the spiritlessness of  the character
came up immediately (Güleroğlu 2014). 
 
Conclusion
56 In the discussion above I have pursued an explanation for the fate of various Ottoman
historical dramas released in Turkey in the wake of Century, attempting to understand
why some projects succeeded while others failed. Ultimately, the measure of a text’s
success is its ability to engage a public. This engagement has a commercial side, which
is currently measured in terms of ratings for TV and in terms of box office for film, but
it also includes many other dynamics such as the watching and discussion of the texts
that takes place among family, friends, and acquaintances; the study, popularization,
and retelling of history linked to the texts; the use and formation of social groups to
share information and commentary on the texts and the history they depict; and the
interactions between creators, critics, and lay viewers of the texts. Such exchanges are
all examples of productive activations of a text and, insofar as they continue to build,
drawing on and leading into one another, they comprise the reflexive circulation of
discourse that characterizes what Warner calls a public. 
57 I  have  attempted  to  trace  evidence  of  this  discourse  by  highlighting  a  variety  of
reactions  to  the  texts,  including  their  most  salient  praises  and  critiques.  These
evaluations not only shed light on the different viewing formations the texts elicited,
but also on some of the reasons for their success or failure. My overarching conceit in
tracing  this  path  has  been  the  notion  that  different  nostalgic  approaches  to  the
creation and activation of texts will have much to do with whether a TV show or film
ultimately foments a public. 
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58 In short,  it  appears that  restorative approaches to the Ottoman past  face an uphill
battle in establishing a public among TV viewers. This is not a singular explanation:
production quality, timing, acting, and countless other aspects of each of these texts
certainly  had  much  to  do  with  their  ultimate  success  or  failure.  Nevertheless,  the
pattern exemplified is  striking,  and appears all  the more so when highlighted with
critical  reactions from cultural  intermediaries and lay viewers alike.  In the Turkish
setting, Ottoman-era historical dramas that portray history with a restorative nostalgic
inflection (Rebellion and Conqueror) had a difficult time keeping TV audiences interested.
The reflectively nostalgic portrayal of Century, on the other hand, led to arguably the
most popular Turkish TV show ever.33 The realm of film may be different, as Conquest
clearly demonstrates that a restorative approach to Ottoman history can meet with
commercial success and establish an active discourse community.34 
59 This is not to suggest that restorative or ultimately conservative programs in general
are bound to fail.  On the contrary,  one of  the country’s  most popular and longest-
running franchises, Valley of the Wolves [Kurtlar Vadisi] tends to engage publics that are
conservative  in  terms  of  religion,  nationalism,  and  social  norms.  Furthermore,  its
underlying mythos is very much in line with the pan-Turkist, pro-Ottoman, nationalist
view highlighted by Onar and the presentation of  this  mythos includes a  distinctly
restorative nostalgia for the Ottoman past.35 Yet, even though this nostalgia provides
Valley’s mythical impetus, guiding the characters and affecting plot development, it is
not the program’s overriding gestalt, as in the case of the Ottoman projects we have
examined. 
60 Something shifts when the overarching project of a text is the Ottoman past. When one
enters the realm of Ottoman history, one enters the realm of taboos, and the choice to
challenge or observe these taboos is key. Restorative approaches respect the taboos;
reflective approaches are less likely to do so. Since the spectrum between these poles is
clearly relative, the approach to taboo must be evaluated with reference to the viewing
formation that characterizes each project. Generally speaking, however, the long-term
engagement offered by TV shows seems to require that some of the taboos on Ottoman
history be broken in order to give audiences a chance to identify with the characters
and, thus, the shows. As a public engages with a program in a reflective manner, its
members partake in various tangible  if  diffuse forms of  recreation: discussions and
debates about the “truth” the show and what “really” happened; book purchases and
internet searches to learn more on historical tidbits from the plot; visits to historical
sites for tourism, pilgrimage, or a combination of these; purchase of jewellery, clothing,
or decor inspired by the show, and the like.36 
61 The would-be publics for restorative projects, on the other hand, are offered avowed
re-creation rather than recreation—the “absolute truth,” in Boym’s terms, of a purified
past.  The audience is  invited to  watch and admire rather than participate;  to  view
history and its characters from a discrete distance. Such accounts eschew questions
and,  thereby,  room  for  discussion  or  further  investigation—the  key  practices  in
forming a public. 
62 Restorative nostalgia is not without its participatory outlets—in the case of Conquest,
Istanbul’s Panorama 1453 museum and the 29 May celebrations are two examples—but
they may entail  an engagement of  a  qualitatively  different  nature than their  more
reflective counterparts. The questioning (or not) of the past and probing (or not) of
taboos is one key distinction. In this sense, the re-creation of the past that takes place
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in the restorative milieu may be akin to the more unidirectional interaction once said
to characterize filmic reception: the viewer is, relatively speaking, more passive and at
the whim of the image presented.
63 There  may  appear  to  be  echoes  of  Marshall  McLuhan  (1994) here  —medium  and
message as closely interwoven— and, indeed, I believe this work accents some of the
difficulties inherent in presenting restorative accounts of history through a TV series
in  a  free-market  media  environment.  This  is  not,  however,  to  say  that  restorative
histories are doomed to fail; it is rather to highlight the multitude of problems such
projects faced in the particular nexus between entertainment, politics, and the past in
contemporary Turkey. 
64 Ultimately,  both  reflective  (Century)  and  restorative  (Conquest)  approaches  to  the
Ottoman past have had great success in this environment, and this may suggest that
very different publics are engaging these productions.  The result  is  a paradox with
regard to the Ottoman past that is perhaps best illustrated with reference to a Turkish
proverb: taklitler aslını  yaşatır37 (the imitations bring life to the original). Century and
Conquest are imitations that have brought their respective originals back to life in a
manner  of  speaking:  their  living,  breathing  representations  have  been  recorded  in
moving pictures and made available to viewers on a heretofore unprecedented scale.
And yet these imitations present very different pictures of an “original” past that is
often assumed to be monolithic  in Turkey.  Their  side-by-side existence speaks to a
divide in Turkish society that reflects disputes not only about the nature of the past,
but also the present and future of the country. This divide, increasingly palatable each
day, is anything but history.
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NOTES
1. This and all subsequent translations mine. The original Turkish was as follows: “Bizim görevimiz
nedir, bunu çok iyi biliriz. Ecdadımızın at sırtında gittiği her yere biz de gideriz, her yerle biz de ilgileniriz
ama  bunlar  televizyon  ekranındaki  ecdadımızı  zannediyorum  o  Muhteşem Yüzyıl belgeselindeki  gibi
tanıyor.  Bizim  öyle  bir  ecdadımız  yok.  Biz  öyle  bir  Kanuni tanımadık.  Biz  öyle  bir  Sultan  Süleyman
tanımadık. Onun ömrünün 30 yılı at sırtında geçti. Sarayda o gördüğünüz dizilerdeki gibi geçmedi. Bunu
çok  iyi  bilmeniz,  anlamamız  lazım. Ve  ben o  dizilerin  yönetmenlerini  de  o  televizyonun sahiplerini  de
milletimizin huzurunda kınıyorum. Ve bu konuda da ilgilileri  uyarmamıza rağmen yargının da gerekli
kararı vermesini bekliyorum” (Radikal Staff 2012a).
2. While some have suggested that the figure could reach over 1 billion when Century starts
broadcasting  in  China  (Zaman Staff  2014),  the  man  in  charge  of  the  show’s  international
distribution,  Global  Agency  CEO  Izzet  Pinto,  told  me  in  March  of  2014  that  the  additional
audience was likely to be closer to 100 million.
Re-creating history and recreating publics: the success and failure of recent...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 19 | 2014
21
3. In fact, there have been reports that Erdoğan’s own attack on Century was inspired by a trip to
Egypt, where he was questioned by then President Morsi or another high-up politician as to why
he allowed such a  depiction of  the Ottomans (F5 Haber Staff  2012).  From the perspective of
heritage studies,  Century’s  international  circulation might be usefully  viewed in terms of  the
historical  relations  between the  Ottomans  and the  territories  where  the  program circulates.
Different  discourses  about  the  show  dominate  the  agenda  in  former  Ottoman  territories
depending on whether the population there is primarily Muslim or Christian, and this situation is
even more diverse  when considering the territories  of  former enemies  of  the Ottomans and
countries that had little or no relation with the Empire.
4. Throughout this paper I use a number of terms to refer to the media texts, either TV shows or
films, at hand. These terms include “program,” “(TV) show,” “series,” “franchise,” “film,” and
“text.” Among these, “program,” “(TV) show,” and “series” are used to refer to texts that appear
on TV in a serialized fashion. These tend to be interchangeable, though “series” is often used to
emphasize the collective. “Franchise,” refers to a group of such texts that has more than one
iteration, as in a series of films, a TV show that also includes films, or multiple instances of
closely related TV series.  All  of  the above are possible renderings of  the Turkish word “dizi”
(literally “series”) in situations where I have translated. “Film” refers to a production created for
cinematic (also called “theatrical”) release. In accordance with prevailing practice, even digital
productions created to target cinematic release are called “films.” “Text” is used to refer to any
of the above media texts, and is most commonly employed to suggest some degree of analysis. On
the prevailing practice of referring to such media products as “texts,” see Threadgold (2005). 
5. The fall of 2014 is slated to have a number of new Ottoman-themed dramas, particularly on the
state broadcaster, TRT, which had one miniseries (Çırağan Baskını - detailing a coup at Çırağan
Palace)  and two series  (Filinta -  an Ottoman police story;  and Diriliş  Ertuğrul -  a  story of  the
foundation of the Ottoman Empire). Even bigger news is the highly-anticipated return of Century
production company TIMS to the scene with Kösem Sultan in the fall of 2015.
6. The Panorama 1453 Museum commemorating the conquest of Istanbul is perhaps the most
striking example  of  the  museum/amusement  park synthesis.  Miniatürk and Vialand are  two
other Istanbul attractions that lean further in the direction of amusement.
7. Onar speaks of political representation, Öncü of narrative, and Mills of discourse. These terms,
though employed in their specificity, overlap insofar as they are all socio-political constructions.
Onar’s political  perspective is  not exclusive of the approaches of Öncü and Mills  but,  rather,
provides  a  broader  tapestry  from  which  the  figures  for  specific  iterations  of  the  Ottoman
“imaginary” can be drawn. It is clear, for example, that Öncü’s conquest-to-tolerance narrative is
linked to both the neo-imperialist and the pluralist Islamist categories mentioned by Onar, while
Onar’s liberal type shares much with Öncü’s Belle Époque.
8. “Chapter 3 - Nostalgia for the present: struggle for the present in Magnificent Century,” in my
PhD dissertation. I am currently revising the piece to article form.
9. And commented on by many others, including Şafak (2011).
10. This  topic  is  tackled  in  the  aforementioned dissertation chapter  on Century.  Drawing on
Jameson, Appadurai, and Huyssen, I suggest that the distinction between the imagined and the
lived  is  far  more  problematic  than  it  might  initially  appear,  particularly  when  the  role  of
advertising is taken into account.
11. Warner touches on this problem of limits with regard to language as well: “In addressing
indefinite strangers, public discourse puts a premium on accessibility. But there is no infinitely
accessible language, and to imagine that there should be is to miss other equally important needs
of publics: to concretize the world in which discourse circulates, to offer its members direct and
active membership through language, to place strangers on a shared footing” (Warner 2002: 108).
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12. In fact, my tentative observations on Century’s international reception suggest that it tends to
circulate restoratively in many locales, while I make the argument elsewhere and below that it
circulates reflectively within Turkey.
13. I here adapt Bennett’s term “reading formation” to emphasize the nature of the activity at
hand in television and film viewing. While Bennett and Woollacott (1987) continue to employ the
term “reading” in their analysis of audio-visual texts, I prefer to emphasize the visual aspects at
hand. This is in keeping with a recognition of the “visual turn” noted by WJT Mitchell (1986,
1995, 2005) and others, with particular debt owed to DeLuca and Peeples’ notion of the “public
screen”  (2002),  a  rethinking  of  Habermas’  “public  sphere”  for  our  highly  mediated  age.
Ultimately, whether the reference is to “reading” or “viewing,” this and related projects attempt
to trace discourse through a wide array of social and technological media.
14. The previously mentioned dissertation chapter.
15. A rare event, since Century was generally filmed either on set or on locations at the Şehzade
Mosque, the Otağ-ı Hümayun at Yıldız Technical University’s Davutpaşa campus, or the forest of
the German Consular summer residence in Tarabya.
16. When  Mustafa  was  eventually  killed  on  the  show  in  February  of  2014  a  massive  set  of
reactions from Century’s public made their presence felt in formal and social media. 
17. A  pseudonym.  Interviews with  anonymous informants  are  not  cited  in  the  bibliography.
Instead I include the month and year of the interview after the cited material.
18. This is the name by which Süleyman is commonly known in Turkey. It refers to Süleyman’s
role in reforming and codifying laws.
19. See, for example, the covers of satirical weeklies Girgir and Leman for 28 November 2012, or




20. As of September 2014 it has been surpassed in terms of both ticket sales and total viewers by
the  comedy  films  Wedding  League [ Düğün  Dernek],  and  Recep  Ivedik  4.  See  http://
boxofficeturkiye.com/tumzaman/?tm=1989
21. This moment would likely have a certain familiarity for its Turkish public, as it mimics a very
famous photo of US President Bill Clinton and a child taken as he visited the site of an earthquake
in Turkey in 1999. I have explored this photo and the trope it began in Turkish political imagery
in  an  essay  (Carney  2014).  Others  have  also  pointed  out  this  resemblance  (e.g.  Finkel  2012;
Kechriotis 2012).
22. Here and below, the work of columnists is treated alongside that of film critics. Though there
are important differences between these categories (see, for example, Andrew Finkel’s comments
on the status accorded to columnists in Turkey (Finkel 2000: 154-155)), both are among those that
Bourdieu (1984) calls “cultural intermediaries,” a group with elevated power to influence public
discourse. Ultimately, it is discourse, whether at the level of film critique, socio-political critique,
or conversation, that interests me
23. Börekçi  is  far from alone in his appraisal  of  the Turkish educational  system. For further
analysis of the nature of this system, especially in terms of its highly codified approaches to
nationalist mythology and historical figures, see Altınay (2004), Çayır (2009), Ceylan and Irzık
(2004), and Kaplan (2006).
24. My  primary  research  was  on  the  TV  shows  Valley  of  the  Wolves and  Century.  I  did  not
specifically attempt to reach viewers of Conquest, though I often asked my informants about the
show in the course of our interviews. It is striking to me how few of the people I interviewed
about  Century had  watched  (or  would  admit  to  having  watched)  the  other  major  Ottoman
costume drama of the time. Viewers of the nationalistic crime drama Valley, on the other hand,
also frequently reported having seen Conquest.
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25. For a general overview of the Gülen community see (Hendrick 2013); for a more recent take
on the struggles between this community and the AK-Party see (Hansen 2014).
26. The women in the palace frequently appear in bikini-like attire and at one point there is a
bath scene that openly hints at licentiousness, so it is little surprise that religious conservatives
might object to these aspects of the film.
27. Century’s first season started in January 2011, and was thus only a half season. The entire
series ran 139 episodes and there have been rumors of a filmic conclusion (Biroğlu 2014). In its
Turkish broadcast, the show was preceded by a summary of the previous week, which tended to
run about 40 minutes, thus making for an entire viewing experience that often spanned over
three hours with commercials included.
28. The pre-production name of this project was actually Silver Tulip [Gümüş Lale].
29. The word fatih means conqueror in Turkish, but also refers to the very specific conqueror
Mehmed II, and is often used as a substitution for his name.
30. Show TV was Century’s home for its first full year of production—the 2011 calendar year—
which spanned two TV seasons. After that, Century shifted over to Star TV, where it remained
until the conclusion of the series in June of 2014.
31. This is one of two Ottoman-themed TV shows that quickly followed Century that I will not
discuss in this paper. The other is Ottoman Slap [Osmanlı  Tokadı].  Harem was mildly successful,
airing for a 32-episode season between September 2012 and June 2013. According to FOX Turkey’s
general manager, Pietro Vicari, it was “set sometime in Mesopotamia” and had “nothing to do
with the Ottoman Era” (Medyafaresi Staff & Vicari 2012), though the show followed themes and
events from Century on an almost weekly basis. As a parody, the show’s primary target seems to
have been Century and the viewing formations that activated it, rather than Ottoman history as
such.  Since  Harem both drew  on  and  contributed  to  these  formations,  it  is  of  interest  in
understanding the circulation of Ottoman era shows, but I will not attempt a discussion of that
matter  in  the  present  work,  which  focuses  on  texts  that  lay  more  overt  claim  to  historical
correspondence. Ottoman Slap is a story of two Janissaries from the era of Mehmed II who travel
through  time  to  present-day  Istanbul  and  offer  the  wisdom  and  charity  of  the  past  to  the
denizens of today’s Turkey. It began airing on TRT-1 in April of 2013 and finished a year later
after holding onto modest  ratings for 37 episodes.  As with Harem,  the show is  of  interest  in
understanding  the  greater  Ottoman-inspired  viewing  formation,  but  it  cannot  be  called  a
historical drama and thus falls outside the scope of the present project.
32. A similar point is made by Anibal Güleroğlu, who says “some of the scenes are put together so
poorly that the viewer can’t simply pass over the logical gaps but is, rather, forced to laugh at
them, asking ‘is Conqueror a historical comedy?’” (2014).
33. When considered in global terms. The other contender for this title Gümüs (Noor in Arabic or
Silver in  English),  had  massive  viewership  in  the  Arab  world,  but  did  not  achieve  global
significance, and was far less popular than Century within Turkey.
34. The persistence of  this  community may,  however,  be less  certain in the case of  film.  As
Warner notes, the temporality of discourse is a key aspect of public formation, and TV series,
with their regular broadcast schedule, provide a predictable rhythm, which may encourage the
reflexive circulation of discourse (Warner 2002: 95-96). With film, such an environment is far less
common—though  cult  films  and  film  series  are  possible  exceptions.  Conquest was  unique  in
bringing together a number of factors that allowed for a public (as distinct from an audience) to
form:  its  year-long  run  in  Turkish  cinemas,  its  role  as  the  biggest  film  of  the  time,  the
controversies it elicited in other countries, which fed into discussions regarding the show, and
the quite  different  approach towards  history  that  it  took relative  to  the  already established
Century.
35. Briefly, Valley imagines a Turkic deep-state that has had a continuous existence for about
2,000 years, including the Ottoman Empire, which is highly exalted by the show. The ultimate
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form of this state now rests in the control of a secret intelligence unit directed from within the
Turkish state, but with ties to other countries as well.
36. This  partial  list  is based on my numerous  interviews with  various  members  of  Century’s
viewing public between 2011-2014.
37. I thank Gaye Eksen for bringing this proverb to my attention.
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